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IN-PRINT SYMPOSIUM:
THE MYTH OF MORAL JUSTICE
INTRODUCTION
Thane Rosenbaum*
I wrote The Myth ofMoral justice,' primarily, as a moral critique of
the legal system. In examining the rituals and practices of the law under
moral criteria-its obsessive focus on zero-sum contests, its dedication
to cold rules and procedural technicalities over human emotion, its fail-
ure to acknowledge the spiritual pain of those who come before it, its
inability to create an atmosphere where apologies, reconciliation, and
the restoring of moral balance to relationships is possible, its preference
for judicial economy over truth, its privileging of secrets and indiffer-
ence to lies, and its failure to promote an atmosphere of mutual caring
and connection by not imposing a duty to rescue-the book is an in-
dictment of the legal system for smugly believing that the correct legal
result is necessarily consistent with the right moral outcome.
Evidence and procedural rules, attorney-client privileges, settle-
ments and plea bargains, the hostility of adversarial proceedings, all se-
verely undermine the storytelling, truth-seeking dimensions of what
people expect when they come before the law. And this failure lies at
the heart of why moral justice is merely a myth. A legal system that
cares mainly about applying the law in mechanical, overly technical, and
soulless ways to the exclusion of other values is not a legal system that is
interested in making sure that its judgments make moral or emotional
sense to those who look to the law for wisdom, guidance, and
resolution.
But more broadly, despite its focus on developing a unified theory
of justice, the book speaks to something that transcends the law and the
legal system. What I perhaps did not realize when I first conceived of
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this book was that the legal system was only one facet of a larger under-
lying social criticism. The Myth of Moral Justice challenges society to
engage in a moral conversation about the legal system. That, to my
mind, is its best contribution to reform. But that conversation applies
equally, or at least should apply equally, to other professions, institu-
tions, and patterns of human behavior. The audacity of the book is not
that it takes on the legal system, but that it does so on moral grounds,
subjecting the law to moral scrutiny.
Invoking moral issues and adopting them as part of the public dis-
course is not something American society-or at least a particular seg-
ment of society-is comfortable doing. Whether acknowledged or not,
there is a split between the legal and the moral in the American legal
system. And it is not even a conscious split. The moral issue is simply
not part of the picture, and no one seems to be alarmed by its absence.
That is because legal decision making and moral consciousness are not
the same things, and no one is particularly troubled by the lack of inte-
gration between the two.
Distorting and manipulating the truth, perpetuating lies, confusing
administrative justice with fundamental notions of what is just, subject-
ing legal outcomes to a hostile knock-down, drag-out sporting contest
where the goal is to destroy one's adversary, silencing victims and the
aggrieved from speaking to their losses, injury, and betrayal, creating an
atmosphere of implacable defensiveness and unapologetic self-righteous-
ness rather than one of true human encounter and moral repair, are not
examples of a moral system of justice. Yet these practices are not only
perfectly legal, they are standard practice in our legal system.
The split between the moral and the legal also plays itself out in
the wider world, which perhaps explains why the legal system only mir-
rors the surrounding culture rather than leads it by example. Doing the
"right thing," as a governing philosophy, is not part of the professional
mindset, or something that professionals believe in. Indeed, most peo-
ple, when it comes to their conduct at work and the fruits of their labor,
do not evaluate themselves according to moral criteria. We believe, or
have been led to believe, that our moral and private spheres of existence
stand separate and apart from our professional and public lives. Our
duties as workers, our professional tasks, and our interactions in the
public sphere, are not subject to moral scrutiny. These activities are,
essentially, what we do away from the home; they are the very essence of
why we leave our homes during the workday.
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For some bizarre reason, our activities outside the household, how
we spend the hours between nine and five, the manner with which we
win bread for our families and secure our futures, is not deemed a moral
enterprise or covered by moral rules. We are expected to conduct our-
selves as moral men and women only within the thresholds of our pri-
vate lives, within our homes and inside our picket fences, among our
families, and inside the temples, churches, and mosques of our religious
communities. As long as we are faithful spouses, as long as we read to
our children at night, as long as we are kind neighbors and charitable
citizens, our moral rectitude and reputation remain secure.
Seemingly, it is perfectly acceptable to engage in all manner of un-
ethical, immoral and vulgar conduct during the workweek, perpetrated
remorselessly against the strangers among us-our business competitors,
customers, and classmates-as long as we are good people at home.
Home is the center of our moral universe. Morality and moral agency is
required only when we sit inside pews and contemplate the awesome-
ness of the almighty, or when we seek to teach moral lessons to our
children. Morality, however, is optional everywhere else. It is merely an
extracurricular and discretionary impulse outside the home. In fact, tak-
ing your children to work is never a good way to impart moral lessons in
America, because apparently the workplace is the last place where pro-
fessionals and businessmen display their moral fiber or exert any moral
muscle. Morality is deemed without material value as a consumer good.
In short, morality does not apply to one's day job.
So in a very real sense, The Myth ofMoral Justice, in challenging the
legal system to evaluate its practices according to moral criteria, might as
well have been asking all professions to do the same thing-all in the
spirit of doing the "right thing." Is the split between the legal and the
moral, and between the moral and professional, inevitable and immuta-
ble? Is it not possible to introduce moral concerns into our professional
and public lives, not unlike the way in which we insist that morality
guide our private and religious selves? What if we were to no longer
tolerate any separation, no further excuses for immoral behavior outside
of the home? What would happen if we expected the same conduct
everywhere, all the time?
Now, as I pointed out in the book, moral justice is neither depen-
dent on, nor dictated by, religious guidance. Moral justice does not take
its direction from religious authorities or divine law. The fact that peo-
ple make this assumption is part of what is wrong with the quality of
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public debate in America. We have capitulated the moral ground en-
tirely to religious institutions, as if morality is the province only of the
religious world rather than something that is innately human and ulti-
mately an expression of our humanity. One does not have to be relig-
ious, or even believe in God, in order to be moral and to engage in
moral acts. And morality does not only have to be defined in religious
terms. Atheists are quite capable of being moral, and vegetarians who
refuse to eat animals on moral grounds do not have to identify them-
selves as religious in order to have developed this moral mindset. In
fact, most religions impose no prohibition on the eating of animals.
Does that mean that atheists cannot have a moral basis for declining to
eat meat since religions apparently have no moral qualms about doing
so?
Doing the "right thing" is a democratic impulse, and an infectious
one, as well. It can be done by everyone, without regard to religious
conviction or commandment. We should not, and we must not, con-
fuse religious morality with something that is much more basic and
commonly understood: the simple distinctions between right and
wrong. These distinctions are not necessarily connected to religious
teachings, but have far more to do with human agency-the interior
spark of our moral impulses.
The problem is we have banished moral conversations from our
public discourse, and consigned them to the margins of the religious
realm. Many people mistakenly believe that morality is the language of
religious people, and therefore has no application in the secular world.
Moreover, we have treated morality not only as if it has no real-world,
practical implications, but that it also cannot be supported by a con-
crete, absolute truth.
Morality, we are told, is what inflexible, narrow-minded religious
zealots believe in, those who are too comfortable with their blind faith
and who are unwilling to subject their ideas to the rigor of scientific
analysis. These are people too set in their ways, obsessed with the cer-
tainty of absolute judgment and eternal damnation, and who wield their
morality like a weapon. The problem with them, we are reminded, is
that they do not seem to realize that there is no one truth, and that
nothing is absolute.
Given this bias against religious people and the consignment of
morality into their presumably anti-intellectual hands, no wonder mo-
rality has a bad name in America, having been demonized as the creepy
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thinking of fringe fanatics, those who are implacably judgmental, intol-
erant, and too intoxicated with God for their own good. But this ban-
ishment and disavowal of morality is completely unfair and
intellectually dishonest. We live in a society where we are taught to
respect the differences among us, to realize that morality is subject to
great diversity within cultures, and that morality sometimes has its own
inner logic.
Moral relativism stands for the principle that morality is, indeed,
relative, and therefore it cannot be imposed against those who have a
different conception of what is moral. But somewhere along the way we
have relativized morality to the point where it has no meaning. If every-
thing is relative, then nothing can be deemed principled. All we do is
account for difference, and tolerate all kinds of bad behavior.
But the fact is, the world of moral relativism shares at least equal
space with moral realism. There are some truths that are absolute, vir-
tues that we know to be obvious: kindness, compassion, mutual respect
and dignity, telling the truth, accepting responsibility for one's actions
and undertaking meaningful gestures of repair, acknowledging the pain
of our fellow citizens as well as the pain that we either inflict on others
or allow to take place through our indifference and neglect.
These are golden rules. It is hard to argue with them, because they
make emotional and moral sense. Internally they feel right. There is no
issue of moral relativism here. If there is, then morality is pointless, and
there is even less hope for humanity than first imagined. Even religious
authorities agree on these same principles-moral concepts that are eas-
ily accepted as basic truths and common courtesies. Moral justice does
not only exist on the polar extremes of human complexity. Yes, abor-
tion is a tough call, because both sides can make a moral argument on
behalf of their stated and impassioned positions. Each side can justifia-
bly claim to be doing the "right thing."
But most everything in life takes place in the middle, and not at
the margins. Most moral questions are not as red hot and inflammatory
as is abortion. Most areas of conflict have the potential for a moral
resolution because the truth is not elusive, but rather known.
Excusing bad behavior on the pretense that what constitutes good
behavior is either relative or unknowable is the most pathetic example of
moral laziness and intellectual dishonesty. Why insist on having our
children tell the truth or apologize when they are wrong if adults will
not live up to these same standards? What if children cynically invoked
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relativized thinking every time they sought to talk their way out of a
timeout? Parents would clamor for the return of corporeal punishment.
Doing the "right thing" is usually not so complicated; it is not
brain surgery or physics. People can do it, and should be expected to do
it. But the impulse toward relativizing truth and morality is great, and
castigating morality as a byproduct of religious mediocrity is even
greater.
This is not helped by the fact that with all of the recent blue and
red state geographic alignments, liberal intellectuals see red as the enemy
and regard morality as the language of religion. Liberals and progres-
sives treat morality like a foreign language, spoken fluently only among
red state inhabitants. So the polar divide truly is one that transcends the
Electoral College, and merges into the syntax of our national vocabu-
lary. One segment of our population is comfortable framing issues in
moral terms, while the rest of America, over-represented at universities
and inside magazines, believe that invoking morality in any setting-
particularly as the inspiration for public policy-lacks intellectual rigor
and panders to the dumbing down of America.
Of course, a majority of Americans thought otherwise, and the re-
election of President George W. Bush was, curiously, not just a presi-
dential election, but also a referendum on morality in America. Obvi-
ously, a majority of Americans desire having moral conversations and
wish for their elected officials to exercise moral leadership-whether
they are capable of doing so or not.
The question is: Have liberals and progressives, democrats and rela-
tivists, professionals and public servants, heard this mandate? Because,
at least in my view, doing the "right thing," whether in actuality or
merely as an aspiration, should not only be a Republican strategy.
Democrats, too, are capable of conceptualizing ideas and justifying pub-
lic policy without surrendering the moral ground. And religious leaders
should not permit their congregants the easy escape hatch of engaging in
a split morality-the sugar pill of virtue that is maintained in one's
private life, with the blind eye to all the immorality that exists in the
business world.
The moral issue is always the elephant in the room, but Americans
somehow believe it is possible to ignore it, largely because nothing can
be done about it. But indifference is the worst moral insult of all. We
have an obligation to ourselves and to each other to apply moral reason-
ing and moral action to all phases of our lives. We know this to be true,
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but we have either forgotten, or we have grown complacent, or the peo-
ple with whom we surround ourselves represent such poor role models
for moral behavior.
As a law professor, novelist, and someone who teaches law and
literature, I have been told, anecdotally, that when it comes to law
school applications, there are a surprising number of essays that cite To
Kill a Mockingbird-both the novel and film-as having influenced the
decision to apply to law school and to become a lawyer. I have taught
this novel for years, and I suppose the reason for its affection among
prospective lawyers is mostly traceable to the character of Atticus Finch.
Atticus Finch is the model of the moral attorney. Here is one law-
yer who, surprisingly, doubles as a human being. He is someone dedi-
cated to doing the "right thing" even though he is well aware that the
decision to represent Tom Robinson will expose him and his family to
considerable risk. The performance of his job is not without personal
consequence. And beyond that, he knows from the outset that he will
lose the case. And yet he takes it on anyway. He could do the simple
and expedient thing and bow out. But instead, he chooses to do the
"right thing," because as he repeats throughout the novel, if he does not
represent Tom Robinson, he will not be able to parent his children, or
represent the town in the legislature, or walk the streets with his head
held high and his dignity intact.
So what happened to all these lawyers who read the novel or
watched the movie and became inspired to one day practice law? Did
they somehow lose their inner Atticus Finch? I do not think that the
answer is that they forgot the novel. I think that other values and prin-
ciples simply intervened and obliterated whatever inspiration they once
drew from the story.
One final thought. When The Myth of Moral Justice was pub-
lished, it received considerable critical attention in major newspapers,
magazines, radio, and television. Not all of it was laudable. Many
thoughtful people had severe reservations about its underlying premises.
But the one thing that never happened, the one thing that completely
surprised me, is that no one chose to defend the legal system on moral
grounds. No one challenged the central premise of the book: that when
the legal system pursues justice legally, it is not necessarily succeeding
morally. Moral justice is a myth largely because our legal system does
2 HARPER LFE, To KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (1960).
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not feel burdened in any way to provide moral relief. Yet no one at-
tacked my premise, no one proclaimed that justice is moral, and that
moral justice is not a myth.
Instead, everyone seemed to buy into the book's premise. They
surrendered the one point that I felt no one would or could accept-
that the legal system is not moral. Rather than challenging the thesis,
my critics seemingly defaulted to a secondary defensive position-
claiming that my ideas were impractical, or that morality itself is so
illusory and relativistic that it cannot be applied to conflict resolution,
or that I was seeking to impose religious law on an otherwise secular
society.
But no one defended the legal system on moral grounds. Why? I
do not know. Either they felt that such a defense was indefensible given
the severe moral deficiencies of the legal system, or, that those who gen-
erally review books are the same type of people who disdain having
moral conversations. Ironically, they were not about to attack my book
by resorting to the very language they refuse to speak.
But that too was a mistake. Even my critics missed an opportunity
to take the book on its own terms, and address the challenge that the
book raises without surrendering the moral ground that The Myth of
Moral Justice so, dishearteningly, mythologizes.
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